NATIONAL AND RIGHT-WING RADICALISM
IN THE NEW DEMOCRACIES:
CZECH REPUBLIC

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National and Right-Wing Radicalism in the New Democracies: Czech Republic

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The Czech Republic is a country where radical right has had a long tradition, but its past as well as present position in the party system is relatively weak. On the contrary, since 1989 there has been a strong militant ultra-right youth spectrum, which is responsible for numerous violent actions. The Czech ultra-right scene co-operates closely with foreign political partners and in some cases it even works as a carrier of new trends between Western Europe (Germany in particular) and some post-communist countries.

1. Ideological taxonomies in the national context

The extreme right in the Czech Republic is ideologically fragmented on the basis of differing historical role models. The form of behaviour of individual types of actors and their relationship to legal political procedures also differs. Drawing a precise line between a part of the conservative right and the radical right is also problematic. The annual government “Report on extremism in the Czech Republic” plays an important role in the formation of public perception of right-wing extremism. The document in principle interprets extremism as the contrary of democratic constitutional state (the German official interpretation is an obvious inspiration). This document lists both registered and non-registered entities that the government perceives as extremist.

From the political viewpoint, we can distinguish the following two basic forms of the Czech extreme right:

1) the nationalists
2) the neo-nazis

The basic difference between these two branches lies in their relationship to the legacy of Hitler’s national socialism and the Czech collaboration during World War II. While the Czech nationalists reject a positive view of Hitler nazism and occupation, do the neo-nazis perceive the historical model of national socialism at least as a partial inspiration. However, in many cases is the line between these two fundamental branches ambiguous. We can find representatives of both of them in some organisations. In addition to that, we must not forget
that in case of neo-nazism, the name is only external. Those of we will call neo-nazis, do not use that name and usually call themselves national socialists or nationalists (národníci).

1. 1. Nationalism

In addition to that are the two branches internally further split. The first sub-type of Czech nationalism can be externally called “progressive nationalism”. They are rooted in the tradition of the 19th century Czech national revival and a specific interpretation of the 15th century Hussites movement. They often include important persons of the Czech democratic traditions in their propaganda. However, on that basis they intolerantly speak out on behalf of the interests of the Czech ethnically perceived nation. They also largely include anti-clerical components.

The second sub-type of Czech nationalism is inspired by Czech extreme conservatism from the second half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. The authoritarian and pan-Slavic ideas are typical for this sub-type. It is also partially interconnected with the ultra-conservative Catholic circles (Lefebrists, among others) that should nevertheless rather fall under religious radicalism or extremism.

The Czech neo-fascism is the third sub-type of Czech nationalism that has close historical ties with the second sub-type. It builds on the traditions of Czech fascism, that was anti-Semitic, anti-German, pan-Slavic and anticomunist oriented. Thanks to the link with clerical catholic circles, even one part of neo-fascists gets to a position of clerofascism, in Moravia in particular.

1. 2. Neonazism

Neo-nazism in the CR can also be split into more sub-types, although their division lines are harder to define than in case of nationalists. The first sub-type is the dogmatic neo-nazism, that closely builds on the original German nazism and the loyal Czech collaboration. It sees Czechs as an Aryan nation, which should be integrated in the future state structures linked to the German Reich idea. It rejects the Czech-German confrontation, even in history

1 The Hussite movement was inspired by the Czech religious reformist Jan Hus. The modern nationalist interpretation though suppresses the religious aspect and highlight the Hussite wars as the fights of Hussites with foreign (German in particular) crusaders. The idea of fighting with “bloody foreigners” is at present also directed at Roma and immigrants.
assessments. That is for example why they agree with returning property to Sudeten Germans and their expulsion in 1945 is perceived as a mistake. Neo-nazis do not even identify with the current Czech flag, because they see it as a history of the “Jewish-Mason Czechoslovakia”.

Another part of Czech neo-nazism works with the concept of the Czech nation as an autonomous and equal Aryan nation, which has a right for autonomous state existence within the family of Aryan nations. Sometimes it views the Czech nation as a residue of the Slavic, Celtic and German interbreeding on the Czech territory.

One part of neo-nazism is even linked to neo-pagan movements. Generally speaking, even this sub-type of neo-nazism is inspired by the national socialist model of government in Nazi Germany and even shares the same anti-Semitism. However, it rejects the overall German or rather German Reich domination. In this way, it builds on some branches of Czech collaboration from the initial period of the Czech and Moravian Protectorate. Their representatives wanted to establish their own Czech National Socialist state within the New European Order.

1. 3. National Socialism in the Czech political tradition

At this point, it is essential to explain the different meanings of national socialism in the Czech environment. The neo-nazis in the CR use the ambiguity of the meaning of national socialism in their legal strive for non-punishability. In principle, there are three dimensions of national socialism in the Czech Republic. The first relates to the German national socialism of Hitler or Strasser type, including the national socialism’s expressions of the German Sudeten movement. The second dimension of national socialism relates to the transfer of the totalitarian national socialist model to the Czech environment, but without the ideas of subservience of the Czech territory to the German Imperial conceptions. Both these conceptions are closely linked to the right-wing extremism and the line between them is sometimes unclear. The third conception of national socialism is tied to the domestic political movement of non-Marxist socialism with national accents that developed within the Czech political movement from the end of the 19th century². This national socialism forms an important part of the Czech democratic traditions, because it supported the democratic procedures (at least within the national state). However, we must not forget, that it delimits
itself against the German national feelings and it was also strongly expressed in the politics of the Czechoslovak president Edvard Beneš who’s Decrees resulted in the expulsion of the vast majority of German population from the Czech territory in 1945-1946.

After 1989, this stand-alone party representation of this democratic national socialism did not become a relevant part of the political spectrum, among other reasons mainly due to internal disagreements in this movement. However, a number of registered parties had and have the “national socialist” in their name. Usually they had a rather centralist and left-wing identity, later on they co-operated even with extreme right-wing nationalists on a number of occasions (the progressive “neo-Hussite” type). Ideas of the last mentioned traditional Czech national socialism can be seen in the politics of the two largest Czech political parties (the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS)), in the thought background of the Czech president Václav Klaus and some of his advisors and sympathisers even on the side of one part of the media.

In the Czech context, the anti-German nationalism and the pan-Slavism strongly exist in one part of the communist left and the left-wing nationalist organisations close to their structures. In some cases, even these structures co-operated with the nationalists extreme right, in particular by supporting Serbia.

The conservative right blends with some branches of the Czech extreme right nationalism, in particular with Euroskeptic initiatives and in recent years also with activities supporting traditional moral and cultural values (in particular the recent initiative called “D.O.S.T.”). The pronounced anti-Communist circles strive to constrain the influence of former as well as current communists in the CR another point of intersection.

In the CR there were even some partial extreme right manifestations in the domestic ethnic-territorial movements as well as in the Diaspora of emigrants. In terms of the first case, these are in particular ultra-right trends in the Moravian ethnic-territorial movement and attempts of the German extreme right to recruit among Germans in Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia (unsuccessful in its effect). As for the second case, these are mainly ultra-right cells among

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Ukrainian immigrants\textsuperscript{4} as well as individuals in certain other immigrant communities\textsuperscript{5}. However, from the Czech political system point of view, their political phenomena are marginal and thus we will not pay attention to them any further in this document.

2. The Development of the extreme right

2.1. History of the Czech extreme right to the 1989

The first seeds of extreme right in the Czech lands can be traced back to the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, i.e. in various chauvinist and anti-Semitic clubs. The rival Czech and German extreme right had developed in the Czech lands separately until 1939. At the beginning of the 20s of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the extreme right spectrum started to take systematic shape. The authoritative right-wing trends existed in the Czech movement in particular in the Czechoslovak national democracy as well as in some other parties, the National league among others. The co-operation of this branch of ultra-right parties culminated in the establishment of \textit{National Unification} (Národní sjednocení) for the 1935 elections, where they however received only 5.6\%. This group was headed by the Czech pan-Slavist Karel Kramář. The first Czech fascists inspired mainly by the Italian role model, spun off the National democracy in the beginning of the 20s. Since 1926, the \textit{National fascist community} (NOF - Národní obec fašistická) led by Radol Gajda, an ex-general of a Czechoslovak anti-Bolshevik legion in Russia, served as an umbrella for various branches of Czech fascism. However, it never received more than 2\% of votes in any elections. In 1933 attempt some of its members a military coup by seizing the barracks in Brno-Židenice. The attempt ended as a fiasco. The NOF also had various violent paramilitary groups. Apart from NOF, there were also some smaller fascist groups, the \textit{Flag} (Vlajka) in particular.

The Hitler national socialism echoed in parts of the Sudeten German movement already in the twenties and it gradually grew stronger. Sudeten German nazis acted not only against the Czechoslovak state, but also against the anti-fascist Sudeten German organisations, including

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\textsuperscript{4} In 2007, a branch of the All-Ukrainian Unification, the Freedom (Svoboda), was established in Prague. Kupka, Petr – Laryš, Martin, Smolík, Josef: \textit{Krajní pravice vy vybraných zemích střední a východní Evropy. Slovensko, Polsko, Ukrajina, Bělorusko, Rusko} (Extreme right in selected CEE countries. Slovakia, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia). Brno: the Masaryk University, 2009, p. 129.

\textsuperscript{5} As a rarity we can mention unconfirmed information on a KKK member in the American community in Prague, which is otherwise rather leftist and liberal.
social democrats. The **Sudeten German Party** (SdP) led by Konrád Henlein was strongly nazified. In the 1935 Czechoslovak elections, SdP was the strongest party with 15.2% of votes. It even established its own para-military organisation named **Freiwilliger Schutzdienst** (FS). Their members later on formed the basis of the **Sudetendeutsche Freikorps** that came to life in the rebellion against Czechoslovakia in September 1938 and was organised from Germany. After 1933, the Czech lands served as refuge for anti-Hitler immigrants from Germany, including the members of the revolutionary national socialist wing of the Nazi movement **Schwarze Front**.

In September 1938, after the Munich Agreement, Czech border regions were handed over to Germany. SdP transformed into NSDAP. The so called Second Republic with right-wing authoritarian regime was established in the remaining part of Czechoslovakia. This regime still serves as inspiration for some current Czech nationalists. The **National Unity Party** (SNJ – Strana národní jednoty) played a dominant role in the Czech lands. Some most radical groups of Czech fascism and non-democratic national socialism also acted against the new regime. It was mainly the **Flag** (Vlajka), which had already left its anti-German feelings behind and started a co-operation with German Nazis.

Once the remaining parts of Czech lands were seized on 15 March 1939, the Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia was established and fully subordinated to the Great German Reich. Some people in the Protectorate administration fought for an autonomous Czech politics in the initial period, but gradually they were replaced by completely loyal collaborators. The Protectorate Minister of Education, Emanuel Moravec, became a symbol of collaboration. During 1939-1941 was the new Protectorate administration opposed by numerous Czech fascists groups, which were hoping for a more important role in the new regime (Vlajka dominated). In the beginning used occupants them to exert pressure on the authorities of the Protectorate but since 1942 they were either forced into unconditional subordination to the official Protectorate government or liquidated. Nazis wanted order in the Protectorate as they needed smooth functioning of domestic military and other industries.

Current Czech neo-nazis lack any combat tradition from the Protectorate period, a tradition that is important for the current international neo-nazi co-operation. Occupants and collaborators perceived the small and badly armed Government army as lacking credibility. For a long time, Germans refused to establish combat units made of Czech collaborators.
They yielded only in 1945 and allowed the formation of St. Vencelsas volunteer platoon, which was part of the SS, but it was defeated in May 1945 by Czech rebels. In the initial period after 1945, Czechoslovakia established a limited left-oriented democratic regime and in 1948, Communists seized power and established a totalitarian regime. Till 1946, the Werwolf and similar groups had been active among German population. However, the vast majority of German population was expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945/1946. In 1945-1947, illegal groups emerged in the Czech population, building on the Protectorate collaboration, but this phenomenon was rather marginal. Many fascists and collaborators left the country and created their own structure. During the communist regime, nazi trends occurred rather sporadically in certain rebelling youth groups. In the second half of the 80s, racist trends reach the Czech lands and the punk and newly established skinhead sub-culture, first without any clean-cut ideological anchor. The Orlik music group established in 1988 found inspiration in the Hussite nationalism. On the other hand, first neo-nazi skinheads emerge as well.

2.2. History of the Czech right wing extremism after 1989

The right-wing extremism in the Czech political spectrum started to develop rapidly only after 1989. The Majority of their activists were middle-aged individuals dissatisfied both with the communist regime and with the development of the social and economic transformation. Mostly, they did not have a clear-cut ideological anchor either. Only a few individuals attempted to transfer ideas of pre-war fascism and right-wing authoritativeness into the new political spectrum. A small ultra-right part of exile that got involved in domestic politics also provided certain support. The youth skinhead sub-culture played an important role as well as certain individuals that gradually left with trends towards a more elaborate political activity.

The most important right-wing extremist party in the 1990’s – the Assembly for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa – SPR-RSČ) – was an ideological mixture of the above mentioned streams. The progressive nationalism was the most influential. A very important element for the presentation of the party was its chairman – Miroslav Sládek. The party had a parliamentary representation in 1992-1998 (electoral results in the 1990’s: 1990: 1,00%, 1992: 5,98%, 1996: 8,01%, 1998: 3,90%). It lost this position because of the growing political culture in the country (in contrast to the primitive populism of the SPR-RSČ) and political scandals and
internal clashes of the leading persons of the party. The present position of the party is marginal (in the European elections in 2009 the SPR-RSČ won only 0.31% of votes). After the SPR-RSČ failure, several competitor groups attempted to replace the party in the partisan system. The first attempt – the National Socialist Block in 2001 – failed. A joint project of several ultra-right parties before 2006 elections also failed. First, the so called National Fifth (Národní pětka) was established in 2005, but it fell apart. None of the ultra-right formations received more than 0.5% of votes in 2006.

The Czech extreme right witnessed a partial upswing in the Czech partisan system only from 2008 with the arrival of the Worker’s Party (Dělnická strana – DS), splitting up from the SPR-RSČ in 2002. The first name was the New Force (Nová Síla – NoS), since 2003 the party has got the present name. During the first years of its existence the DS had various political partners, including the anti-Pangerman left wing Club of the Czech Borderland (Klub českého pohraničí – KČP) in 2005.

However, in 2006/2007 it started as a co-operation with neo-nazi organisations. In 2008, also the paramilitary vigilant organisation of the party – Protection corps of the Worker’s Party (Ochranné sbory Dělnické strany – OS DS) was founded. In the regional elections in 2008, received this organisation 0.99% (28 865 absolutely) of the votes. The DS created in these elections a coalition with the small Democratic party of Social Justice (Demokratická strana sociální spravedlnosti – DSSS). The governmental attempt to ban the DS from November 2008 was not successful, because the Supreme Administrative Court rejected in March 2009 the governmental proposal due to a lack of evidence. In the European elections in 2009 the DS won 1.07% of votes (25 368 absolutely). Due to this result this party received a state funding for the first time. In September 2009 send a new proposal for the ban of the DS to the court the Czech government.

The National Party (Národní strana – NS) can be understood as the most important representative of the progressive nationalism with neo-Hussite elements. It was founded in 2001. Its chairman is Petra Edelmannová. The Roma-phobic and anti-Islamist attitudes are the most important propaganda topics of the NS. In 2007, the paramilitary vigilant National Guard (Národní garda – NG) was founded under the leadership of the chairman of the NS. The influence of the party in the party system is limited. In the parliamentary elections in 2006 it won only 0.17% of the votes.
Other organised representatives of the Czech authoritarian nationalism are small parties like the National Unification (Národní sjednocení – NSj) and the National Democratic Party (Národně demokratická strana – NDS). The Law and Justice (Právo a spravedlnost) is right on the border between conservatism and extreme right. The neo-fascist traditions are represented by the civic association Patriotic Front (Vlastenecká fronta – VF). It was founded in 1993 in the post-Skinhead milieu. It is one of the oldest far right organisations in the Czech Republic, however, now it has only several tens of members. Neo-clerofascist ideology is typical of the small non-registered Movement of National Unification (Hnutí národního sjednocení – HNS) which was founded in 1995. The HNS has its roots mostly in Moravia (Moravia is traditionally more Catholic than Bohemia).

3. Voters and activists

It is not possible to prepare a detailed profile of the structure of voters of the current right-wing extremism in the CR, because the repeatedly low results of right-wing extremist parties in elections do not allow a meaningful analysis of the social and demographic profile. The geographical division of support is the only convincing indicator.

The European elections in 2009 showed that the Worker’s Party is strongest in the Northern Bohemia, a region with high unemployment, low living standard and a high concentration of Roma population. The Worker’s Party received 2.76% of votes in the Ústí region in the elections, which was more than 1,5% above the national average. In the Most and Teplice districts, the Party got 5,16% and 4,14% of votes respectively.

According to research carried out for Czech TV by agencies SC&C and STEM before the planned early elections in September 2009, the Worker’s Party had a support of 4,2% of voters in the Ústí region (while their national average is around 1%). According to this research, the Worker’s Party had a higher share of sympathisers among young people, male and unskilled people with only initial education.

6 However, the DS domination in the North Bohemia was not so obvious in the 2008 regional elections. The party was most successful in Western Bohemia, in the Plzeň region (1,5%), and particularly in the Rokycany district (3,2%). See more in Kyloušek, Jakub - Smolík, Josef: Krajní pravice v krajských volbách 2008.(Extreme right in the 2008 regional elections). the Central European Political Studies, vol. X, no. 4, 2008, p. 385.

7 However, the Czech Constitutional Court called off the early elections in September 2009 as unconstitutional, so regular elections will take place in 2010.

The last European elections also clearly showed that the **Worker’s Party** is successful in regions with a problematic co-existence of majority population and Roma communities, and the Party highlighted the problems\(^9\). Locations with operational Worker’s Party Protection Corps that “monitored” the level of offending among Roma, showed significantly higher support for DS than the national average (which was 1.07%). Generally, these municipalities are in Northern Bohemia. The following table gives an overview of DS Protection Corps (OS DS) pre-election activities\(^{10}\), their location, brief description and DS results in the European elections in 2009 (for comparison, we also state the DS results in regional elections in 2008):

### DS Protection Corps and results in elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Brief description</th>
<th>Results in EU 2009 elections (regional elections in 2008)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14. 10. 2008</td>
<td>Litvínov - Janov</td>
<td>12 members of OS DS, verbal incident (racist insults from protesting Roma)</td>
<td>7.81% (3.43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. 2. 2009</td>
<td>Postoloprty</td>
<td>Approx. 40 participants, OS DS and ordinary DS members, without incidents, population observing</td>
<td>6.67% (2.03%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 3. 2009</td>
<td>Litvínov – Janov</td>
<td>Approx. 40 participants, OS DS and ordinary DS members, without incidents</td>
<td>7.81% (3.43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. 4. 2009</td>
<td>Krupka</td>
<td>Approx. 50 participants, including OS-DS, OS DS and ordinary DS members, without incidents</td>
<td>7.96% (0.88%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) The DS however achieved record results of 32.16% of votes in the EP elections in the Všeherdy municipality (Chomutov district), where they did not send their Protection Corps.

\(^{10}\) There was only one action of the Brigades after the EP elections, i.e. monitoring of a Romanian group of migrating Roma in the Central Bohemian town of Husinec.
24. 5. 2009   Bilina   60 members of DM and DS, including OS DS, Roma protests  7,73% (1,80%)

Source: the author, data on individual events - the Police of the CR, the Workers Party, youtube.com; elections data, the Czech Statistical Office.

As for the DS activists, we do not have exact data on its membership. According to governmental estimates, the Party has 300 members. The original members were recruited from ex-members of Sladek’s Republicans and its youth organisation. The present DS chairman, Tomáš Vandas, was a long-term secretary of SPR-RSC. Since 2008, the party also has its youth organisation headed by Martin Zbela (former chairman of Republican youth). Since 2007, the DS was strongly enhanced by young militants from among neo-nazis that even made it to their ballot. There is a strong link between the traditional republicans and young militants, in particular in Northern Bohemia. A young activist Lucie Šléglová also plays an important role in this region. She became a distinct face of the Party after the Janov incident in October 2008. The Party also has other relatively strong females (e.g. Iveta Machová in Northern Moravia). However, the DS does not have its own female organisation. The following table shows the structure of their ballots in the 2008 regional elections (where it formed a coalition with the small Democratic Czechoslovak Party and the coalition was called the Worker’s Party – for abolishing the fees in health care):

The 2008 ballot of the Worker’s party – for abolishing the fees in health care, by age and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total abs.</th>
<th>Men abs.</th>
<th>Women abs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in %</td>
<td>in %</td>
<td>in %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 - 29 years</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 49 years</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and above</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age</td>
<td>35.40</td>
<td>36.08</td>
<td>33.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lucie Šlégrová took part in the DS Brigades action in Litvinov in October 2008. They were strongly challenged by armed Roma, that cursed Šlégrová in a vulgar, sexist and racist manner (two of them were later convicted). The images of diminutive Šlégrová facing the Roma activists became very popular in media.

11 Lucie Šlégrová took part in the DS Brigades action in Litvinov in October 2008. They were strongly challenged by armed Roma, that cursed Šlégrová in a vulgar, sexist and racist manner (two of them were later convicted). The images of diminutive Šlégrová facing the Roma activists became very popular in media.
As for other parties, the numbers of voters are so negligible that they do not allow for a meaningful analysis. The National Party (Národní strana – NS) has realistically 50 members. It is interesting, that its chairwoman, Petra Edelmanová, studied economics and has a PhD. from politology. The membership of other extreme right-wing parties and civic associations in the CR is also very small and does not exceed dozens of members.

4. Young extremely right-wing militants and ultra-right sub-cultures

4.1. From skinheads to National Resistance

Ultra-right youth sub-cultures in the Czech lands started to develop already in the 80s, when racist trends emerged in certain part of the punk sub-culture which identified with so-called nazi-punks in the second half of the 90s. However, for a long time the skinhead sub-culture became the main carrier of the ultra-right movement among youth. This sub-culture started to develop in the mid 80s. In the beginning of the 90s, similar to the whole ultra-right spectrum, the ultra-right branch of the skinhead sub-culture was split into so-called Ultraquists (kališníci – that identified with the Hussite tradition, and the calyx was the Hussite symbol), the “faschos” (that identified with the Czech fascism tradition), and the Nazi-skinheads (that found inspiration in German nazism, one part of skinheads in the Sudetenland also identified with the Sudeten German movement).

Even some stable organisations developed on the basis of the neo-nazi skinhead sub-culture, mostly as Czech branches of the international neo-nazi networks. The most important examples are Bohemia Hammerskins (BHS), founded in 1993, and Blood & Honour Division Bohemia, founded in 1995. These organisations declared that they were the elite organisations of the skinhead-scene.

At the end of the 1990’s, a new trend came from Germany called the free nationalism. The Czech neo-nazis tried to create a network of free cells without a leader (they were inspired also by the American concept of the “leaderless resistance”). According to these principles the National Resistance Organisation (Národní odpor – NO) was founded. It is now also the leading structure of the Czech neo-nazism. Inside the National Resistance and the free nationalism movement, the skinhead image gradually started to be rejected, as it was
discredited in public perception. The female organisation called Resistance Women Unity (RWU) closely co-operates with the National Resistance.

4. 2. Autonomous nationalists

A very important position within the Czech neo-nazi-scene is occupied by the Autonomous Nationalists (Autonomní nacionalisté - AN). This, partially subcultural, partially strategic-political phenomenon has its roots in Germany in 2002/2003. It is a modernisation of the traditional neo-nazi style with new images (Black Block style inspired by the left-wing Autonomous), political propaganda (including graffiti), political style (mass violent activities) and radical revolutionary rhetoric (motto is Free - Social - National). The rejection of skinhead image as a discredit form of look is typical for the AN.

The first elements of the autonomous nationalism were observed in 2004 among the NO members in several cities in the Czech Republic. However, the real rise of the AN started in 2006. Some of the first Czech autonomous nationalists were inspired by the traditions of the Czech pre-war fascism and some of them paradoxically had also the skinhead-image. However, at least since 2008 the Czech AN-scene has been more and more similar to the German model. The Czech AN are also an inspiration for the contemporary rise of this phenomenon in Slovakia and Poland.

The NO and the AN have co-operated with the Workers Party, its Protection corps and its youth organisations – Workers Youth (Dělnická mládež – DM, founded 2009) on several meetings. The members of the AN and NO were responsible also for the mass anti-police and anti-Roma violence after the demonstrations of the DS in Litvínov – Janov in 2008 and in Přerov in 2009. During the riots in Litvínov some citizens helped the neo-nazis because of anti-Gypsy hate.

4. 3. Militants and white power music

There exist also several small regional neo-nazi-groupings in the Czech Republic, for example the White Rebels Clan, Radical Boys Brüx and various local groups of national socialists and nationalists. The organisation White Justice organises paramilitary trainings and propagates
terrorist methods. The terrorist ideas of the Combat 18 or “Russian way”\textsuperscript{12} are popularised in the scene, however, up to now without any real activities. On the other hand, several arson attacks committed by local neo-nazi cells against the Roma have recently been committed\textsuperscript{13}. The Czech neo-nazi activists are engaged in organising concerts with international participation. Several white-power bands play within the Czech neo-nazi scene (Adler, Impérium, Conflict 88, Nomisterion etc.). A specific dimension has the small national socialist black metal and pagan scene and organisations on its basis (a. o. Bratrstvo - Brotherhood).

As stated above, the ultra-right militant elite gradually threw off its skinhead image. This was to the benefit of the appearance of free nationalists that use fashion brands tied to NS-scene. Several domestic (Nibelungen, Eighty Eight, Grassel) and international (Thor Steinar) fashion brands are popular in the scene. According to the example of autonomous nationalists, most of the scene also took up the “black block” clothing style. The ultra-right skinheads are still active in rural areas. The neo-nazi scene is in some locations closely linked to football hooligans (e.g. in Prague, Most, Ostrava, Jablonec nad Nisou, Opava, Brno, Olomouc).

Although the knowledge of national socialism and the level of involvement in the scene differs, do the current young militant ultra-right scene show mainly neo-nazi trends. Overall, it is rather difficult to determine exactly the size of the youth militant scene. We can estimate that the „hard core“ consists of some 50 individuals that organise important events and provide ideological background to the scene. Further 400-500 individuals form the convinced and active part of the neo-nazi scene. Further 3000-4000 individuals are loosely involved sympathisers (that are for example willing to support a local or important national demonstration from time to time).

In terms of age, the leading hard core is formed by people of around 25 years of age. But considering that some people have been in the scene since the beginning of the 90s, activists around 35 years of age are no exception. The large part of demonstrators are however younger people around 20 and even younger. Approximately one fourth of activists are women. The activists’ social status differs a lot. Most of them come from lower social classes, but the

\textsuperscript{12} The “Russian way” relates to the expansion of neo-nazi violence in present Russia, including terrorism and targeted liquidations of political adversaries, journalists, legal experts etc.

\textsuperscript{13} The incendiary attack in Vítkov in April 2009 attracted huge attention, as a 2-year-old Roma baby girl was severely burnt in that attack.
number of activists with secondary and university education is growing. However, the above stated data are based on a very loose estimate. So far, no exact sociological surveys of the Czech scene were conducted.

5. Issues of the agenda

5.1 Deratization and freedom of speech

The Czech extreme right uses numerous issues for its agenda, but only some are really important for their public profile and differentiation from other entities. The extreme right opposes the current system, which it describes as corrupted and estranged from ordinary people’s interests. The Worker’s Party in its elections campaign even calls its political strive to eliminate the regime - the „deratization“. When the party magazine, the **Worker’s Press** (Dělnické listy), asked about the meaning of „deratization“ in the DS policy, the party’s chairman, Tomáš Vandas answered as follows:

"Well, certainly not a Velvet Revolution of the 1989 type. We will not strike any questionable agreements with anyone or collaborate with this corrupted regime. We want to win in a democratic way, remove them from power and start to make order. That is what we mean by deratization. Cleaning up the society, eradicating corruption and political swindle, ending the plundering of state assets at the expense of taxpayers."

The extreme right generally tries to criticise the current political system also from the position of „defenders of the freedom of speech“. They mostly point to the prosecution of extreme right-wing activists for their verbal expressions that the Czech criminal law sees as criminal. In a wider sense, they criticise the alleged „dictatorship of political correctness“. However, the political correctness in their sense in fact includes anti-racist politics. The extreme right also tries to benefit from the fact that the state and the media are harder against them than on the extreme left. They then link anti-communism and anti-anarchism by criticising the influence of former and present communists in the official politics and the presence of former or present anarchists in the non-governmental anti-racist sphere, possibly with reference to the fact that even security forces use information from antifascist actions.
5. 2. Anti-Gypsyism

However, the public most willingly listens to the anti-gypsy extreme right, typical for whole Central Europe (maybe except Poland). Both the Worker’s Party and the National Party made the Roma issue a focal point of their EP election campaign in 2009. The Czech TV refused to air their election spots with anti-Roma motives as possibly racist. The militant scene uses brutal violence against Roma. Since 1990, some 20 Roma were murdered for racial motives (however, police does not always succeed in proving racial motives), and there have been hundreds being injured and assaulted (there are no exact and standardised statistics).

The extreme right also tries to use the Roma issue for attacking political establishment representatives. The chairman of the Prague organisation of Worker’s Youth, Matyáš Sombati, characteristically stated in an article for the Voice of the Youth magazine (Hlas mládeže): „Our objective is, has always been, and will always be our people, their safety and wellbeing, and our identity. We do not point in hatred to the Gypsies parasitizing on the work of Czech people, but to the current system and its representatives, that permitted and caused it. This hatred is a natural consequence of our self-love.”

5. 3. Immigration

The extreme right speaks strongly also against illegal immigration. The Worker’s Party program states: „Stateless people will be excluded from all state benefits and subsidies. We do not want to be „sewer of Europe“ and a country full of immigrants coming from former Soviet Union countries, the Balkans, Asia, Far East etc. We demand the closure of all immigration camps and all benefits for immigrants. Only persons with required moral qualities and professional skills can receive political asylum or residence permit, with a prerequisite of adapting to national traditions and habits of the Czech people and with a guarantee of full assimilation into the majority society“.

The anti-immigration rhetoric of the National Party goes hand in hand with islamophobia. The National Party organised numerous islamophobic events. In 2006, the Party made a public attempt in Prague to burn a figurine of the prophet Muhammad, but was stopped by the police. The National Party’s last public presentation was a protest against a plan to build a new mosque in Brno in 2009.

5. 4. Antisemitism

The Worker’s Party does not show any marked islamophobic tendencies. Many Czech neo-nazis have a positive attitude towards the Iranian president Mahmúd Ahmadínežád, because of his position on Israel and support to Holocaust deniers. In 2006, a group of 41 neo-nazis from the National Resistance environment even asked the Czech president for permission to serve in the Iranian army, because of the Israel-Hizballah conflict and speculations on possible Israeli-Iranian war.

The request, supported by Petr Kalinovský, – speaker of the National Resistance back then also stated the following: „The battle of Prague takes place in the birthplace of civilisation, the prolific half-moon. In Iraq, Iran and other countries occupied by the Zionists. No one can challenge that. The horrible NATO, slimy EU – all are fanatically supporting Israel. However, the National Resistance does not. The Holocaust must not be an excuse for the Jews preparing genocide on the Persian people. No one can be murdered only because he is not from the Moses tribe or does not subserve it... The proud guard of the National Resistance is ready to step in the upcoming conflict. Be it in Iran or in locations falling under the Czech Republic’s jurisdiction. Should our request be rejected, we still declare: the very first missile launched towards the Iranian soil will be followed by an adequate response of the National Resistance. “

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18 It is interesting, that a year later Petr Kalinovský was shooting from a gas gun at anti-fascist protesters during a demonstration held on 10 November 2007 (notified by the extreme right-wing Young National Democrats as a „protest against the CR involvement in the occupation of Iraq“). In January 2009, he received a 10-months suspended sentence with a 2-year probationary period. Česká tisková kancelář (The Czech Press Office - ČTK): Za střelbu u právnické fakulty dostal Kalinovský podminku. (A suspended sentence for Kalinovský for shooting by the School of Law, http://www.ceskenoviny.cz/zpravy/za-strelbu-u-pravnicke-fakulty-dostal-kalinovsky-podminku/355077&id_seznam=.
The Czech extreme right also shows a strong anti-Semitism, often disguised as anti-Zionism or criticism of Israeli politics. Open anti-Semitism is typical in particular for neo-nazis, but also for a large part of the Czech neo-fascistic scene (including the clero-fascist wing). To some extent, it binds all of these parts of ultra-right together. For a certain part of Czech nationalism, anti-Semitism goes together with anti-German feelings, which is related to conspiracy theories on a joint action of pan-Germanism and Jewishness against the Slavs. These views were influential in the beginning of the 90s as a heritage of pre-war ideologies, but their present influence is very weak.

The extreme right profiles also on many other topics. They criticise feminism and homosexuality (in 2008, a gay/lesbian demonstration in Brno was violently attacked). They come up with extensive requirements on social security for the Czech nation and on the protectionism of the national economy. The Worker’s Party is markedly anti-capitalist. The extreme right also calls for strict criminal policy measures, among other things they also call for the reinstatement of the death penalty. They require environmental protection to be part of their homeland protection.

5. 5. European policy

In terms of foreign policy, they are against EU membership. Usually, they promote the „Europe of nations“-concept (the nations though being only the European traditional nations). They also want to leave the NATO and end all foreign military missions. They criticise development aid to the Third World. The Czech extreme right is also critical towards US policies and they opposed the planned construction of US radar in the CR, which was called of 2009.

Historical revisionism plays a very specific role in the Czech extreme right politics. They do not come up with their own territorial or revisionist requirements (with some exceptions)\(^\text{20}\). The nationalist branch strongly opposes the revisionist requests coming from Germany, in particular the Sudeten Germans. This was an important topic in particular for the SPR-RSČ in the 90s, and at present, the National Party is quite active in this respect.

On the other hand, the neo-Nazis are willing to accept a German revisionist concept. “The fundamental agreement between the Czech and German friends” is so far the most elaborate
document in this respect that came from the liberal and national resistance environment in spring 2009. The document rejects the Beneš Decrees, asks for their abolishment and for compensation of damages caused to the people expelled. It goes on saying, among other things: „... we intentionally build on the German Reich tradition and the Reich allies as a core and support of Europe. Only our joint struggle can stop the destruction, that hostile powers commit on our nations in the form of biological and economic burdens of foreign influence... This contract shall serve the purpose of ending the slavery of our nations imposed on them by the post-war domination of allied winning powers and it shall also eliminate their backstage forces (international finance). That shall build the foundation of mutual respect for promoted policies serving the people and promoting independence and national autonomy of partners and establishing pan-European responsibility“.

6. Public image of the radical right

6. 6. Public opinion

Democratic values are relatively strong in the Czech Republic and the image of the right-wing extremist scene is mostly negative in public. However, the negative image of politicians (corruption etc.) is typical of the greater part of the Czech population (as national elites are often considered artists and athletes, not politicians). The growth of extremism is however seen as negative. According to the survey conducted by the Analysis and Empirical Studies Centre (SANEP) in August 2009, 69% of respondents are afraid of the growing influence of extremist parties (it is interesting, that it was 83% in May 2009) and they think, that it is due to the domestic political situation (76%)..

The “hate-speech law” is used against racism and neo-nazism. This law is criticised by a part of the public as well as by a part of the political, media and judicial elites, because the American model of freedom of speech is relatively popular in the Czech public discourse. Part

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20 The SPR-RSC’s attempt to have the Carpathian Ukraine returned to Czechoslovakia and later on even to the Czech Republic, was a rather odd exception. The Carpathian Ukraine was a part of Czechoslovakia since 1918, then in 1945 it became a part of the Soviet Union.


of the liberal and conservative spectrum criticises also the fact that the legal repressions are aimed only against right-wing extremism, not against left wing extremism (mostly the legal existence of the strong Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia is rejected).

The debate about the Roma is in the Czech Republic very intensive. The anti-Roma prejudices are typical for a greater part of the Czech population. The Public Opinion Research Centre conducted a survey in March 2009 called “the Relationship toward national minorities living in the CR”, and 77% of respondents stated, that they do not like Roma people (out of which 42% said, that they do not like Roma very much), while only 9% of respondents showed sympathy for Roma (the rest of respondents did not know)\(^23\). The following table shows the results of a CVVM survey called “the Citizens about co-existence with Roma and their possibilities in the society”, conducted in May 2009.

### Evaluation of mutual relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Between Roma and the rest in the whole of the CR</th>
<th>Between Roma and the rest in the respondent’s place of residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather good</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather bad</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very bad</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not know</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total +/-</td>
<td>10/85</td>
<td>41/56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6. 7. Discourse about Roma

Roma ethnic crime, connected with the so called “Roma-Ghettos” (marginalised localities with mostly Roma population with a complex of social problems), is a problem in several cities. The extreme right – despite its marginal position in the party system - has a great

impact on the public debate about the “Roma-question”. Repressive activities against the Roma are supported by a greater part of the population (with the exception of brutal arson attacks). In this context Roma political activities have been strong recently, including the radicalisation of part of these activities (creation of ad hoc Roma “home-guards”, the group Gypsy Radical for the monitoring of racist activities was established).

Some regional politicians from the political mainstream use a racist discourse in public debates. Liana Janáčková, former mayor of Ostrava – Mariánské Hory and current senator, is well known for that.24 Already in 1998, she wanted to co-finance air tickets for Roma to emigrate to Canada. In 2006, at a public debate focusing on problems with Roma minority in a local settlement Bedřiška, she stated the following: „...Unfortunately, I have to be concerned with Gypsies. Even if we succeeded with the air tickets back then, they would have re-bred again. So, you are discriminated, we are all discriminated, I totally agree with you. But unfortunately that’s reality. And I have to try to move you away somewhere. I disagree with any kind of integration, unfortunately I am a racist, I disagree with Gypsy integration, to have them everywhere around town. Unfortunately, we selected Bedřiška, so that’s where we will have them. With high fences, electricity, I don’t care what, I have no problems saying it aloud so that the whole world can hear...“25. She was in danger of prosecution for this statement, but the Senate did not lift her immunity.

Many similar statements could be heard from mainstream parties politicians, in particular on the local community level. Apart from that, several politicians on the local level try to gain a profile as assertive promoters of law and order, tough on petty crime, public order violations as well as rent dodgers. Their measures fall primarily on the problematic Roma community, but these politicians publicly reject any racist undertone in their behaviour and do not use open racist discourse. The present mayor of Chomutov, Ivana Řápková (ODS member), is in the Czech Republic an important representative of this branch of community politicians.

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24 Janáčková was in 1991-2004 a member of the Civic Democratic Party, in 2005-2008 she was a representative of the political movement Independents (Nezávislí). She is now a member of the Party of Free Citizens (Strana svobodných občanů – SSO). The SSO was founded in 2008. This party is a Eurosceptical split from the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana – ODS). Members if the SSO are not only traditional democratic conservatives (inspired by the conservative wing of the American Republican Party or “Thatcherism”), but also Czech traditional nationalists a right-wing populists. However, the excesses of Janáčková were committed before her entry to the party.

Xenophobia against immigrants is not as strong as anti-Roma prejudices\textsuperscript{26}. However, in the last years it has become also an important topic of the public discourse, mostly in connection with islamophobia and in connection with the debates about foreign workers in the Czech Republic in times of economic depression. The debate will be with more intense, as the numbers of immigrants increases. The domestic debate on immigration is accompanied also by the European debate on a common immigration policy\textsuperscript{27}.

The anti-EU attitudes are typical of a part of the Czech population as well as of part of the political mainstream\textsuperscript{28} (including contemporary president Václav Klaus) and both the extremes of the political spectrum. On the other hand, the strong support of the European integration by the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats and Liberals is an important element of Czech politics. The rejection of NATO membership is included in the communist and nationalist politics. The anti-globalist discourse is not very important.

In several cases, it is possible to speak about a “grey zone” between ultra-nationalism and conservatism, among others about various Eurosceptical initiatives or about initiatives against “post-modern” values. One of them is the recent initiative D. O. S. T., which is supported by conservatives from the democratic spectrum as well as by extreme nationalists. However, the nationalist element in this initiative is not as important as a general rejection of the European anti-discrimination law or the rejection of the gay-lesbian rights etc. The nationalist or “patriotic” element is typical of conservative parties as well as the communist left (here it is connected with strong anti-Pan-Germanic attitudes).

7. Transnational issues

7.1. History

The Czech extreme right is relatively closely involved in international co-operation. The selection of international partners is determined also by affiliations to certain local ideology

\textsuperscript{26} E.g., in March 2009 opinion poll carried out by the Opinion Poll Centre, 7% of respondents stated, that they are very much for employing citizens in the CR, 48% were rather supportive, 28% rather against and 8% were very much against it, while 9% did not know. Červenka, Jan: \textit{Postoje české veřejnosti k zaměstnávání cizinců (the Czech public attitude towards employing foreigners)}. Prague: The Public opinion survey centre, p. 1, http://www.cvvm.cas.cz/upl/zpravy/100904s_Ov90507.pdf

sub-types. The position of Czech ultra-right organisations – political parties in particular – on the international scene is however limited by their weak results in domestic elections. But the militant scene and neo-nazi musical scene is a respected partner in international structures. The main extreme-right wing party of the 90s, the Assembly for Republic – Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ), searched for various political partners abroad. In 1997-2004, the party maintained intense relations in particular with the Front National of Jean Marie Le Pen, who also visited the Czech Republic and expressed support to Miroslav Sládek. The SPR-RSČ was also a member of Euronat, a free international organisation initiated by the FN. Although Euronat has not faded out, its activity is rather subdued. Mr. Sládek also took part in international congresses organised in Moscow by the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Vladimir Žirinovskij.

Since the mid-90s, parties and organisations close to clero-fascist ideas have developed close relations with similar partners from Poland and Slovakia. This was in particular the National Unification Movement (Hnutí národního sjednocení - HNS) in the CR, the Slovak Solidarity (Slovenská pospolitost) and the National Polish Revival (Národní obrození). Among other ideas, the HNS also wanted to establish a common state of all western Slavs. These organisations were also integrated into the International Third Position (ITP) and later on into the European National Front (ENF). However, the ENF fragmented due to Polish-German disputes.

7. 2. Contemporary situation

Recently, it is mainly the Worker’s Party (DS) that maintains close relations to the Slovak Solidarity (SP). The Worker’s Party also inspired SP to organise the so-called „monitoring actions“ in areas with co-living problems of the majority population and the Roma community. SP members also took part in the DS demonstrations in the Czech city of Litvínov in Fall 2008. On the other hand, DS members participated in the SP anti-Roma actions in Šarišské Michaľany in August 2009.

Presently, the German National Democratic Party (NPD) is the DS’s main partner. The NPD and DS members organised many mutual visits between 2008-2009. The DS chairman Tomáš Vandas appeared at the „2008 Fest der Völker“ organised by the neo-nazi circles in

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Durynsk. The Austrian neo-nazi Gottfried Küssel also appeared at the DS demonstration in Brno on 1 May 2009.

The Czech neo-nazis have developed close relations with the German scene since the mid-90s. They started on the sub-cultural musical basis, but gradually had become more and more political. Since the end of the 90s, the Czech and German neo-nazis have jointly participated in creating the structures of National Resistance (NO) and the free and autonomous nationalists (AN). The German ideas spread via the Czech Republic also to Slovakia (e.g. a gradual creation of NO and AN cells in Slovakia).

The nationalist National Party (NS) developed contacts to the British National Party (BNP) and their chairpersons – Petra Edelmanová and Nick Griffin - paid visits to each other. The NS also co-operates with the Swedish National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokraterna – ND). In 2009, Petra Edelmanová also took part in the Congress against islamisation in Cologne, organised by the “Pro-Köln“ movement. Formerly friendly relations of the Czech NS and Slovak National Party cooled after the NS delegation met in Bratislava with representatives of the Hungarian Jobbik. Despite the fact that co-operation negotiations failed on the Beneš Decrees the Slovak nationalists perceived the meeting held in SK as provocation.

8. Conclusion

In the last 10 years the radical right wing scene in the Czech Republic had no parliamentary representation and the electoral support was around 1%. However, in the last years the support of the Worker’s Party is growing. The number of neo-nazi militants is relatively high. They are able to realise mass anti-Roma riots with support of a part of the public and citizens of the localities neighbouring with “Roma-Ghettos”. Arson attacks against Roma communities are typical. The media are deeply interested in right-wing extremism and scandalise various activities.

The Czech radical right is inspired by various strategic concepts, mostly of Western European and North American provenience. New ideas for the neo-nazi scene are coming mostly from Germany. The violent strategies and their ideological background of the Russian neo-nazis have also been popularised in the last years. The new trends from Germany are often

transferred to other countries through the Czech scene, mostly to Slovakia and Poland (the Autonomous Nationalism is a typical issue).

The rising number of militant neo-nazi activists, the change of their strategy towards riots and mass demonstrations and co-operation with the DS, the paramilitary vigilantism (mostly against Roma people) and the threat of the growing influence of the extreme right in times of economic depression are challenges for the Czech democracy. The Czech government adopted the document “Strategy of the fights against extremism” in May 2009. However, the real combating of right-wing extremism needs a good and functional system of prevention, clear application of law, broad activities of the civic society and a real solution to problems which are used by the radical right-wing propaganda.